tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1537192810536854261.post2190317905972684273..comments2014-03-30T10:40:54.271-04:00Comments on Dean's dough: non-Smith winner of approval voting equilibriumdWjhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12072494989829344049noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1537192810536854261.post-51050913471559791982013-03-12T16:51:14.002-04:002013-03-12T16:51:14.002-04:00If a Condorcet winner (strictly) beats every (50/5...If a Condorcet winner (strictly) beats every (50/50) pairwise lottery, then any equilibrium in which that candidate doesn't (almost always) win, second and third place must be (practically, asymptotically) tied: if second and third are <em>not</em> tied in some equilibrium, each voter votes for candidates it prefers to a 50/50 lottery over the top two candidates and against those whom it disprefers to that lottery, so the Condorcet winner gets votes from more than half of the voters and the second place candidate gets votes from no more than half of the voters. dWjhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12072494989829344049noreply@blogger.com